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ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS CHALLENGING OFFSHORE
DRILLING AS EXPLAINED IN CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY V. UNITED STA TES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
KATHERINE L. HUDDLESTON
I. INTRODUCTION
The now infamous chant "Drill, baby, drill" that filled town halls
and auditoriums across the country during the 2008 United States
presidential election has come to represent the deep political divide in the
United States over the prospect of drilling for oil. After the BP oil spill in
the summer of 2010, this divide has grown even larger, particularly
concerning offshore drilling. However, offshore drilling is hardly a new
phenomenon.
The United States Congress originally passed the Outer Continental
Shelf Leasing Act (hereinafter "OCSLA") in 1953.' This legislation
provided a framework for leasing outer continental shelf areas to private
organizations for the purpose of searching for oil.2 However, two major
developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to large overhauls of the
'53 Act and the OCSLA guidelines.3 These two events were: 1) the
massive oil spill caused by an outer continental shelf "drilling project in the
Santa Barbara Channel on January 28, 1969;"4 and 2) the 1973 Arab oil
embargo, which clearly demonstrated the U.S.'s dependence on foreign
oil.5 The combination of these two incidents highlighted both the serious
environmental dangers of offshore drilling and the pressing need for U.S.
energy independence. Consequentially, Congress passed the 1978
Amendments to OCSLA, which are still in effect today.
Balancing this delicate dichotomy has been both a goal and a
challenge for the Department of the Interior (hereinafter "Interior"),
environmental protection groups and U.S. courts over the past 35 years.
Traditionally, this balance tilted towards energy independence and away
from environmental protection. However, the April 17, 2009 decision of
' Staff member, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 2010-2011. B.A., cum laude, 2008 Georgetown University. J.D. expected 2011,
University of Kentucky, College of Law.
' State of Cal. v. Watt (Watt 1), 668 F.2d 1290, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Outer Content
Self Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2010)).2
1Id
3Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1295.
Id.
6 Id at 1296.
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the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Center for Biological
Diversity v. United States Department of the Interior (hereinafter "Center
for Biological Diversity")7 gives renewed hope to environmental groups
seeking to challenge offshore drilling programs.
This Comment will discuss the Center for Biological Diversity
opinion, its analysis and holding. Section II specifically relates to the legal
and factual background surrounding the case. Section III provides an
overview of the analysis of the D.C. Circuit Court while Section IV




The plaintiffs in Center for Biological Diversity brought several
claims under OCSLA, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1973
(hereinafter "NEPA") and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (hereinafter
"ESA"). 8 Of these, the court only reached the merits of the claims under
OCSLA.9
OCSLA sets up a four-tiered system by which the Secretary of the
Interior is required to evaluate and process outer continental shelf leasing
agreements.' 0 The tiers are as follows: 1) the "preparation stage;" 2) the
"lease-sale stage;" 3) the "exploration stage;" and 4) the "development and
production stage."" Each tier is subject to a different level of review. 12
The requirements under OCSLA are binding on leasing
agreements evaluated by the Department of the Interior. However, even if
the Interior satisfies the above-mentioned requirements of OSCLA, other
federal statutes may bear on the agency's action. For example, NEPA
requires that any governmental agency "assess the environmental
consequences of 'major [flederal actions' by following certain procedures
during the decision-making process."' To demonstrate compliance with
this NEPA requirement, an agency must prepare and submit an
Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "EIS"), detailing "the
environmental impact of the proposed [agency] action."' 4
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
8 Id at 471-72.
9 Id at 472.
sId at 473.
"Id
12 Sec'y of the Interior v. Cal., 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984).
' Nev. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C.Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (2010)).
" Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 565 F.3d at 474 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii)
(2010)).
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Additionally, the ESA requires an agency to consider any threat
that a proposed action may pose to an endangered species before
proceeding with that action." If the agency determines that an endangered
species may be affected, the agency must then "pursue either formal or
informal consultation with the [National Marine Fisheries Service] or Fish
and Wildlife" before proceeding.' 6
As Center for Biological Diversity and other relevant cases
demonstrate, these environmental acts may work separately or in tandem to
affect a proposal for outer continental shelf leasing.
A. Case Background
Center for Biological Diversity arose as a result of an order by the
Interior approving an expansion of leasing areas under OCSLA off the
coast of Alaska. 17 Three environmental groups, the Center for Biological
Diversity, the Pacific Environment, and the Alaska Wilderness League,
filed separate petitions opposing this action.' 8  The cases of those
Petitioners were combined and joined by the Native Village of Point Hope,
Alaska, a tribal government.19
The groups filed four claims against the Interior.2 0  First, the
petitioners claimed that the Interior's actions violated OCSLA and NEPA
because the "Interior failed to take into consideration both the effects of
climate change on OCS [outer continental shelf] areas and the Leasing
Program's effects on climate change." 21 Second, the Petitioners argued that
the Interior violated OCSLA and NEPA by failing to conduct "sufficient
biological baseline research" for the affected areas.22 Third, Petitioners
alleged the Interior violated ESA because the Interior failed to consult with
either the National Marine Fisheries Service or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service regarding the possible effect of the program on endangered
species.2 3 Finally, Petitioners asserted the Interior violated OCSLA because
it "irrationally relied on an insufficient study" conducted by the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (hereinafter "NOAA") as
its sole authority in evaluating the "environmental sensitivity" of the OCS
areas included in the program.24
1s Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 474 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2)).
16 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 474-75; (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.13, 402.14
(2009)).
" Center for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 471-72.
" Id. at 472.
1 Id.
20 Id at 471.
21 Id. at 471.
22 Id. at 471-72.
23 Centerfor Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 472.
24 id
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As previously discussed, approval of OCS leasing occurs in four
stages. At which stage the action is brought will determine the level of
review given by the courts. In this case, the Interior had only completed
stage one, the preparation stage, when this action commenced. 25  The
preparation stage is governed by Section 18 of OSCLA and requires the
Secretary of the Interior to "prepare, periodically revise, and maintain" a
program that is "conducted in a manner which considers economic, social,
and environmental values" of the OCS resources and "the potential impact
,,26
of ... exploration on ... the marine, coastal, and human environments.
During this stage, the Secretary is also required to "consider additional
factors with respect to the timing and location of exploration, development,
and production of oil and gas in particular OCS areas."27 These additional
factors include:
a region's "existing information concerning the
geographical, geological, and ecological characteristics; an
equitable sharing of developmental benefits and
environmental risks among the various regions"; [sic] "the
interest of potential oil and gas producers in the
development of oil and gas resources"; [sic] "the relative
environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of
different areas of the [OCS]"; [sic] and "relevant
environmental and predictive information for different
areas of the OCS."2 8
The final requirement during the preparation stage holds the
Interior responsible for striking a delicate balance between the benefits of
searching for oil and gas and the negative effects the search may have on
29the surrounding environment.
Therefore, the court examined the Petitioners' claims in relation to
these first tier requirements.
25 Id. at 473.
26 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 473 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1344(aX1)).27 Id at 473.
28 Id (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(A), (B), (E), (G), (H) (1978)).
29 Id at 474 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (a)(3)).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Standing
The first major hurdle for the Petitioners in Center for Biological
Diversity was to establish standing for their claims against the Interior.
What may seem like a small obstacle can actually be extremely difficult for
plaintiffs alleging an ideological opposition to governmental action. This
difficulty results from Article III, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution, which mandates that the role of the federal judiciary must be
limited to handling actual "cases" and "controversies."30 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this limitation to mean that courts must "protect
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties."3  The second part of this interpretation, requiring that plaintiffs
feel the effects of an administrative decision "in a concrete way" before
bringing an action, is the basis for the standing doctrine.32
The court then discussed two types of standing, substantive and
procedural, in its analysis of this case. For substantive standing, the court
used the standard and analysis set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
"a petitioner must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is caused by, or fairly traceable to, the act
challenged in the litigation and redressable by the court." Applying this
standard to the facts of this case, the court found that the Petitioners lacked
substantive standing because they had yet to suffer "an injury that affects
[them] in a 'personal and individual' way." 34 Furthermore, the Petitioners
could not establish a causal link between such an injury and the actions of
the Interior.35
Under the injury requirement of the substantive theory of standing,
the court declared that "standing analysis does not examine whether the
environment in general has suffered an injury." 36 Therefore, Petitioners'
standing claim of "climate change ... shared by humanity at large," failed to
establish substantive standing because the alleged injury was too
"conjectural or hypothetical."3 7  However, the court went on to say that
even if the injury were sufficient to establish substantive standing, the
Petitioners could not demonstrate a causal link between such injury and the
3o U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 1.
31 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
32 Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 477.
3 Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 477. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992); Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
' Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 478 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1).
3 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d it 478.
36 Id. (citing Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 at 665).
3 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 478; See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.
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actions of the Interior, especially this early in the leasing process when no
actual exploration had yet taken place."
Under this analysis, it seems that an environmental protection
group might never be able to establish standing to make a claim against the
Interior regarding an outer continental shelf leasing program. However, the
court continued to evaluate Petitioners' claims under a theory of procedural
standing.
Procedural standing was defined by an earlier decision of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Florida Audubon Society v.
Bentsen." That case declared that, "a plaintiff must show not only that the
defendant's acts omitted some procedural requirement, but also that there is
a substantial probability that the procedural breach will cause the essential
injury to the plaintiff's own interestAO In Center for Biological Diversity,
the "threatened concrete interest" asserted by the Petitioners is the desire to
"observe an animal species."4A This interest has been recognized by the
Supreme Court as a valid basis for standing if plaintiffs show proof of
"concrete plansA 2 to visit and observe the species in the near future,
providing "definitive dates" not just hopes or desires.43 The Petitioners
provided this information, and, therefore, the court found that they
established grounds for standing under the procedural theory.
B. Ripeness for Review
After establishing standing for their claims, Petitioners had to prove
that the issues they raised were ripe for review." Ripeness of an issue for
review is also mandated by the "case or controversy" requirement of the
Constitution for federal court jurisdiction to exist.4 5  Ripeness
considerations go to the first half of the Supreme Court standard for "case
or controversy" cited earlier, stating that agencies could not be subject to
"judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized."46  This requirement presented serious problems for the
Petitioners' ESA and NEPA-based claims.
The ESA requires that an agency examine any impact a proposed
action may have on an endangered species.47 If the agency determines that
" Id. at 479.
9 Fla. Audubon Soc 'y, 94 F.3d 658.
o Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479 (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc 'y, 94 F.3d at
664).
41 Id.
42 Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564).
" Center for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479.
4 Id. at 480-84.
" Id at 475.
4 Id. (quoting Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 148-49).
4 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 474.
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a species may be at risk, the agency is then required to consult with either
the National Marine Fisheries Service (hereinafter "NMFS") or Fish and
Wildlife. Based on this requirement, Petitioners brought their third claim
alleging that the lease approval was invalid because of Interior's failure to
consult with these agencies. 49 However, the court found that this claim
ignored the negative implication of the ESA, namely that consultation with
the NMFS or Fish and Wildlife was not required if an agency determined
that no endangered species would be impacted by the proposed action.50
Although Petitioners claimed that the Interior's determination was
incorrect, the court held that the tiered structure of the leasing system must
be taken into consideration. Upholding and citing a previous ruling, North
Slope Borough v. Andrus,5' the court stated "we must consider any
environmental effects of a leasing program on a stage-by-stage basis, and
correspondingly evaluate ESA's obligations with respect to each particular
stage of the program."5 2 Therefore, as the program under review had only
completed the first tier of the leasing process and "by design"... "the
welfare of animals" had yet to be implicated, the court found the claim
made by Petitioners based on an alleged violation of ESA requirements to
be premature.53
The NEPA claim faced similar challenges. The court cited its
previous decision in Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Forest
Service for the proposition that the obligations placed on an agency by
NEPA only mature when the agency reaches a "critical stage of decision
which will result in 'irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources' to an action that will affect the environment."5 4 Therefore, in the
NEPA analysis, the tiered system of OSCLA was, once again, a
determinative factor. The court concluded that under that tiered system,
the "critical stage of decision" was not reached until the leases were
actually issued. 5 Thus, any claim before that time would be considered
premature and not ripe for review.
Despite petitioners' success in establishing procedural standing,
their claims under NEPA and ESA ultimately failed because the issues
presented were not ripe for review. Therefore, the only claims left for the
court to address were the OCSLA-based claims.
4 Id. at 474-75.
49 Id. at 472.
5o Id. at 475 (citing Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443,
1447 (9th Cir. 1996)).
s' North Slope Borough, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
52 Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 483.
53id.
54 Id. at 480 (quoting Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 42, 49 (D.C. Cir.
1999)).
" Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 480.
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C. Justiciable OCSLA Claims
When reviewing the approval of a leasing program under OCSLA,
courts use a two-tier system of review. 56 The first tier involves "findings of
ascertainable fact," which courts evaluate based on a "substantial evidence
test" where the basis for such findings must be "more than a scintilla," but
"may be less than a preponderance of the evidence."57  The second tier
looks at the policy judgments of an agency, which are reviewed to
determine if the decision was "based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there [was] a clear error of judgment."5 8 Petitioners'
first claim under OCSLA alleged the failure of the Secretary of the Interior
to properly take into account the environmental costs associated with
consumption of oil and gas derived from the lease and the climate change
that would be caused by the consumption of these fuels. 9 While OCSLA
requires the Interior to evaluate any adverse environmental effect that could
be caused by the lease, the court found Petitioners' extension of this duty to
include a duty to examine any potential adverse effects of the consumption
of the oil and gas, rather than just the recovery of such oil and gas, as much
too tenuous, stating that "the Secretary ... need only consider the 'potential
for environmental damage' on a localized basis."60 Therefore, the court
found that the Interior has no duty to consider potential future effects of
consumption when evaluating leasing programs.6 '
Instead, the court held that the Interior's decision to focus its
environmental effect analysis on the effects of the actual production
activities that would occur under the lease was proper.6 2 In making this
analysis, the Interior evaluated the potential "greenhouse gas emissions that
would result from leasing, exploration, and development in the OCS, and
examined the cumulative impact of these emissions on the global
environment."'63 The court found that these efforts satisfied the
requirements of OCSLA.64
The court then turned to Petitioners' final claim that the Interior's
sole reliance on a study conducted by the NOAA for its compliance with
OCSLA's requirement to consider "the relative environmental sensitivity of
16 Id. at 484.
s7 Id. at 484 (quoting FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC. V. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151, 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)).
8 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 484 (quoting Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1302).
s9 Ctr. for Biological Diversity at 485.
60 id.
6" See Id. (the "Interior simply lacks the discretion to consider any global effects that oil and
gas consumption may bring about").
6'2 Id. at 485.
63 Id. at 486.
6 Id. at 485.
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... different areas of the outer Continental Shelf's6 was insufficient. 6
Previous cases had held that "all that is required for compliance with
Section 18(a)(2)(G) is 'that the Secretary make a good faith determination
of the relative environmental sensitivity"' and that the Secretary was "free
to use any methodology 'so long as it is not irrational."' 6 7 While the court
upheld this loose standard, it also went on to declare that Interior's actions
in this case violated it.
The NOAA study relied on by the Interior examined environmental
sensitivity of the Alaskan coastline but did not evaluate any offshore
areas.68 Therefore, by relying on this study, the Interior failed the OCSLA
requirement that it consider the sensitivity of "different areas of the outer
Continental Shelf."6 9 The court went on to explain that Interior's duties
under OCSLA for the first stage of the leasing process require a balancing
of the "potential for environmental damage, potential for the discovery of
oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone." 70
Such a balance is impossible when the Interior fails to properly consider
one of these factors, as it did in this case.
Based on this analysis, the court in Center for Biological Diversity
found in the Petitioners' favor and vacated the Interior's approval or the
leasing program, remanding it to the Interior for further consideration
consistent with the court's opinion.7 1 According to the court, such further
consideration must begin with a "more complete comparative analysis" of
the outer continental shelf areas potentially affected by the program.72
IV. IMPLICATIONS
With constant worries looming over the ever increasing prices of
oil worldwide and the amount of greenhouse gases trapped in the
atmosphere, future battles between environmental groups and the
government over OCSLA will likely be more common and more
contentious than ever before. Courts will be asked to decide what should
come first, garnering the fossil fuels our country needs or guarding an
already fragile environment that protects life on this planet? There is no
perfect answer, and as this debate continues the delicate balance mandated
by OCSLA and upheld by the court in this case will be challenged from
both sides.
6' 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (a)(2)(G) (1978).
6 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 487.
67 Id. at 488 (quoting California v. Watt (Watt I), 712 F.2d 584, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(affirming the holding in Watt1, 668 F.2d at 1313)).
68 Ctr for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 488.
69 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(G) (1978).
70 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 488 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1344(aX3)).
1 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d. at 489.
7 2Id. at 488.
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The ruling in Center for Biological Diversity has important
implications for both sides of this debate. For environmental groups, the
court clearly states the standards for establishing standing for these claims.
Establishing standing can be a serious challenge for groups opposing
government action on ideological grounds, as the Supreme Court has
consistently held that injuries must be particularized.7 ' Therefore, claims of
injury to the global environment affecting all residents are generally
insufficient.74 Establishing standing requires not only a showing of a
particularized injury, but also the establishment of a causal link between the
governmental action and the injury. Proving this element becomes even
more difficult when dealing with the kind of tiered system present under
OCSLA wherein actual damage to the environment does not occur until
leases have been obtained and drilling begins. Therefore, preemptive
environmental protective action appears almost impossible under the
standing rules.
However, the court in this case outlined very specific parameters by
which environmental groups can establish standing for these challenges.
Plaintiffs may establish a particularized injury in these cases by showing
that, by omitting some procedural requirements under OCSLA, the
76
governmental agency has threatened some concrete interest. Since an
actual injury need not have occurred to permit a claim, preemptive action
may be taken. However, groups must demonstrate a "concrete interest,"
and, in these cases, the simplest way to establish such an interest is to
provide affidavits from members of the plaintiff groups confirming both an
interest in and desire to "observe an animal species," for any purpose, and
"concrete plans" for making such observations including "definitive" travel
dates. While these are highly specific requirements and might be
difficultly to meet, because of this opinion and Lujan before it, groups have
the court's explicit approval of such a course of action to satisfy the
standing requirements.
However, once groups establish standing, they must still defend
their claims on the merits. These groups typically assert claims that the
governmental action fails on review because the agency did not "abide by a
procedural requirement" that was designed to protect an established interest
of a plaintiff.79  However, the Center for Biological Diversity court
7 Id. at 477-89 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 and Fla. Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 665 to
generally discuss the law of standing).
4 Id. at 478.
" Id. at 477-78 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 and holding that Petitioners' could not
establish either element of standing for their substantive climate change claims).
76 Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8).
7 Ctr for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479.
7 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63.
9 Ctr for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573).
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provided some encouragement for groups making these claims through its
evaluation of the Interior's duties under OCSLA. When evaluating the
Petitioners' OCSLA environmental sensitivity claim, the court upheld the
previously stated standard requiring that the Interior act in "good faith" and
refrain from "irrational" methodology in making sensitivity
determinations,80 but seemed to move away from that extreme deference
stating that previous precedent "did not give Interior carte blanche to
wholly disregard a statutory requirement out of convenience." 1 Instead,
the court implied that Interior's discretion in making the necessary
environmental determinations under OCSLA is not absolute and its actions
must accord with the strict requirements of the text.
Therefore, the court's opinion in this case should give a great deal
of hope to environmental groups seeking to oppose programs authorized
under OCSLA and provides an excellent guide for how they can effectively
do so. However, the court also provides protection for the Interior in
exercising its rights and duties under OCSLA. Despite the court's order to
vacate the Interior's approval of the leasing program in this case, the court
made it clear that outer continental shelf leasing programs will be upheld as
long as the Interior takes care to strictly comply with the requirements of
OCSLA.
V. CONCLUSION
While this case provides a useful guide to environmental groups
seeking to challenge leasing programs under OCSLA, it also dictates how
the Interior can successfully stave off such challenges. When the Interior
fails to meet the requirements of OCSLA, environmental groups can
establish standing and oppose the program at issue. However, by strict
compliance with the requirements of OCSLA, the Interior can protect itself
from such challenges and go forward with approvals of leasing programs.
Thus, "to drill or not to drill" has a definitive answer, at least for
the time being. When done in strict compliance with the law, off-shore
drilling is permissible under existing statutes and any prohibition of such
drilling would require further legislative action. However, while outer
continental shelf drilling is a part of American life, this case demonstrates
that the courts can be a useful tool in ensuring that such programs only
occur with proper consideration and protection of the surrounding
environment.
oId. at 487-88. See Watt I, 668 F.2d 1290; Watt II, 712 F.2d 584.
SId. at 488.
